Statement of George W. Ball before the Joint Economic Committee on the significance of the European Common Market to the American economy. Washington, DC, 1 July 1959 by Ball, George W.
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9TSSSYEIT  9I  GEOREE  b'. BAI,L  BEF'OR!:  TTIE  JOINT  ECONOUiC] 
.
COMI'4ITTEE  ON IIIE  SICNIFICANCE  OF 1T{E--EIIROPENN 
'COMMO'ii-.
MARKET  TCI  T}IE AMERICAN  ECONOMY
the  law  flrm  of  whlch  T am a member serves  as  lega1
counsel  ln  the  Unlted  States  for  the  Conmlsslon  of  the  Errropean
Economlc comnunlty.  rt  Ls also  the  lJnLted States  legal  advlsor
to  the  Hlgh  Authorlty  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Communlty,,
:
r  want to  make  Lt  quLte cLear, however  ,  that  r  appea"  .
before  thls  commLttee  Ln a  pureLy personal  capacLty.  r  have,
not  dlscussed my testLmony wLtf' any of  my European  cllents.,  ano
what  r  say  to  you  today  represente  merely  the  pnLvate vlews  of'
an AmerLcan etttzen.
Unllke  my dletLnguLehed  frlenrls  wlno are  testlfylng  todalr,
,l
r  am not  an economlst.  T.  shau.,  therefote,  Leave to  them,:the
maJor burden  of  dlscusalng  t!.e  economrc slgnlfl  cance of  the
Europgan Common  Market  bo  ArnetLca,  L belleve  T can  eontrlbute
most  effectlvely  to  the  studles  of  tt,Ls  cammLttee by  trylng  to
put  the  common Market  Ln a  poLLtLeaL  perspectlve  and  by  suggest-
1ng  some consldetaLtons  othen  than  economLc that  should  be. gtven
welght  1n  an  appraLsaL  of  the  benefLte  and  dangers  of  the  Common
j
Market  to  the  Unlted  States.  l
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The pornt  r  wlsh  frrst  to  emphaslze ls  that  the  common
Market ls  porltlcal  ln  purpose.  rts  economlc obJectlveg,  whlre
lmportant,  are  nonetheless  secondary.  The glfted  and dedlcated
men who were responslble  for  the  Treaty  of  Rorne,  whlch  serves
the  common  Market  both  as  a constltutlon  and a code of  r.aws,
were lnsplred  by  the  deslre  to  make progress  toward  polltlcal
lntegratlon  --  ultirnately  toward European federatlon.  F,or them
economlc lntegratlon  was the  nreans  to  a polltieal  end.
one can say eategorlcalr.y  that  wlthout  thls  polltlcal
end  there  would  be no  common  Market.  rtre  slx  Natlons  whlch
have Joined  1n the  Treaty  of  Rome  would never  have entened  lnto
such a  revolutlonary  readJustment  of  thelr  trade  pollcles  lf
the  Treaty  had contalned  no fundamental  political  content,
1f  lt  had been r"""iy  a free  trade  area  or  a customs unlon.
Pol1t1ea1  Content  of  tbe  Common  Market
The polltlcal  character  of  the  common  Market  becomes
apparent  when one examlnes  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  under  1ts
provlsions  the  memben  states,  over  a  transltlon  perlod  of
L2 to  1l  years'  w111 ellmlnate  not  only  tanlffs  but  all  0ther
barrlers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods,  servlees,  labor  and
capltal  throughout  the  Eeonomlc communlty,  But  the  Treaty
recognlzes  that  complete moblllty  of  these factors  of  produc_
tlon  can be achleved  only  wlth  a  substantial  measure of  lnte-
gratlon,  lncludlng  the  development of  common  economlc polleles.3
,'  ,For example,  the  member  natlons  of  the  comtnunltyl  ,agree
r )  To work  towards  a  common  flsear  and monetary
po]lcy,  and to  provlde  mutuar  a1d ln  the  event  a
member  country  encounters  balance  of  payments dlffl-
cu1  tles;
2)  To take  measures to  equallze  the  condltlons
of  labor  at  an tncreastngly  hlgh  ievel  and to  apply
the  prlnclple  of  equal  pay  for  equal  work  by men and
womeni
3)  To estabrish  eonmon  rules  and regulatlons
governlng  cartels  and monopolles;
4)  To adopt  a conmon  agricultural  polisy;  and
5)  To undertake  a conmon  commencial pollcy
accordlng  to  a precise  tlmetable  and wlth  speciflc
goars  lncluding  a common  tarlff  governlng  lmports
from  the  rest  of  the  world.
The Treaty  establishes  a European rnvestment  Bank to
supply  capltal  for  modernlzatlon,  the  lmprovement of  productlon,
and development  of  the  retarded  areas  of  the  communlty.
It  provldes  a Soclal  Fund to  nelleve  the  handshlps  to  workers
from  the  temporary  dlsnuptlons  lmpllclt  ln  tracle llberallzatlon.
It  provldes  also  for  the  per$anent  llnkage  bo ,tfie Common  Market
of  those  overseas  terultories  especially  tled  to  one or  another
of  the  member  states,  unless  those  terrltories  deelde  otherrurlse,
and establlshes  a Development Fund for  those  terrltorles.
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One can soy,  in  ottrer  words,
not  only  a poollng  of  reeources  but
the  Slx  Natlons  actlng  as a unlt.
spectrum  of  governmental  declslon.
that  the  .I'reaty  contemplateg
a poollng  of  poltclels  for
Throse  policles  cover  a wlde
Ilstltytlons  of  the CsmmunltI
But  the  essentlal  polltlcal  characten  of  the  Community
ls  most evldent  from  the  lnstltutlons  created  to  oversee the
development of  common  pollcles  and to  admlnlster  the  Treaty.
Those1nst1tut1ons,wh1chref1ecttlrefam1]1artr1part1te
dlvlslon  of  powers,  hopefully  represent  to  many Europeans the
evolutlonary  lnstltuttons  of  a federal  Eunope
The grecutlve  poweJ"  of  the  government  of  the  community
1s shared  by a commlsslon and a councll  of  Mlnlsters.
The commlsslon,  whlch has  the  day-to-day  responslbllity
for  the  adnLnlstratlon  of  the  community,  ls  composed  of
ttEuropeans" --  men appolnted  for  flxed  terms who are requlred
by  the  Treaty  to  act  for  the  communlty as  a whole  and not  to
seek or  accept  lnstructlons  from  any natlonal  state.
The councll  of  Mlnisters,  whlch must concur  ln  many
of  the  declslons  of  the  commlsslon,  conslsts  of  mlnlsters
representlng  the  governments of  the  member  states.  Dunlng the
early  part  of  the  transltlon  per'lod  the  councll  of  ullnlsters
may act  only  by unanlmity;  as  the  transltion  per10d progresses,
lt  may make nany of  lts  declslons  by naJor"lty  vote.5
the  iuglclal  power ls  vested in  a court,  which serves as
the  supreme Judlclal  body wlth  f1nal  Jurlsdlction  to  declde  all
1egal  controversles  arlslng  uncrer the  Treaty.  rt  may hand down
declslons  blndlng  not  only  on enterprlses  but  even on memben
gtates.
The Court  ls  bu1ld1ng up a body of  declslonal  1aw whlch
w111 constltute  a klnd  of  European Jurlspnudence.  rt  now has
on 1ts  docket  over  60 pendlng cases.
The parllapentary  pow,er  ls  vested  ln  an Assernbly.  For
the  tlme  belng  members  of  the  Assembly are  elected  by  the  par_
llaments  of  the  natlonal  states  from  among thelr  own members.
The commlsslon,  however,  has been entrusted  by  the  Treaty  wlth
the  task  of  developlng  a plan  for  the  dlrect  electlon  of  the
Assembly by  the  peoples  of  the  member  states.
The Assembly has many of  the  attrlbutes  of  a European
parllament.  l^ltrlLe  lt  does not  have  the  power to  pass legls-
latlon,  1t  regulanly  revlews  the  work of  the  commlsslon and
by  vote  of  censure  can requlre  the  reslgnatlon  of  bhe Commlsslon
as  a body.  It  ls  slgnlflcant  that  1n the  Assembly the  seatlng
1s by party  grouplngs  and not  by natlonal  delegatloRs.
the  Court  and  the  Assembly serve  not  only  the  Eqropean
Economle Communlty but  also  the  two other  Cornmunltles whlch
have  been establlshecl  by  the  s1x member  natlons  the  Eu,ropean
coal  and steel  communlty  and  the  European Atornle  D.rergy Com-
mlssion6 -\,
'  Itre  drafters  of  the  Treaty  sf  Rome  approached  po1tr't1ca1
lntegratlon  through  economlc neans.  Belng  pragnatl.c  men,  they
fert  that  by lntegratlng  the  economles of  the  slx  member  states
through  the  creatlon  of  a  vast  market  of  lfo  m1ll1on  people
about  the  same  as  the  populatlon  of  the  unlted  states  ttrey
eould  not  only  glve  momentum  to  the  drtve  toward federatlon
but  create  condltlons  in  whlch  solutlons  along  federal  1lnes
were compelled  by an lnexor:able  loglc.
Repercusslons on t
For  a group  of  the  greatest  lndustrlal  and tradlng  na-
tlons  of  the  world  to  commlt themselves. to  an undertaklng  of
such dlmenslons  must necessarLly  have repercusslons  outslde  the
communlty ltsetf.  certalnly  1t  w111  have consequences  for
Amerlcan buslness  and,  the  Amerlcan economy  and,  as  r  shall
polnt  out  later,  for  Amerlcan fonelgn  pollcy  as we1l.
l{hlle,  &s r  have sald,  r  am dlffldent  about  intrudlng
in  the  esoterle  area  of  economlc predlctlon,  r  would  l1ke  to
put  forward  some suggestions  based on random and unsysternatlc
observatlons.  Drrlng  the  past  year  and a ha1f,  r  have  tarked
wlth  l1terally  hundreds of  buslnessmen and government offlclals
both  1n the  unlted  states  and ttre common  Market  natlons,  and
from  these  dlscusslons  f  have formed certain  lmpresslons  whlch
may be of  use  to  thls  Committee.
rt  ls  a  truism,  r  suppose,  that  new developments  tend  to
sltor,t  tlme  acqul-r'e a
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valldlty  of  thelr  own.  rn  appnoachlng the  common  Market  and
1n assesslng  lts  slgnlflcance  for  Amerlca,  there  ls  the  tenpta-
tlon  to  accept  the  observatlons  of  the  flrst  men who happened
to  have addressed  themselves  to  thls  questlon.
It  has,  for  example, become  fashlonable,  parbicularly
1n business  c1rcles,  to  asaume  that  American lndustry  wlll  be
at  a hopeless  dlsadvantage  1n exporblng  to  the  Common  Market.
The argument 1s  that  when the  lnternal  tarlff  --  by
vrhleh J mean the  tarlff  appllcable  to  the  movement  of  goods
across  natlonal  boundarles  wlthln  the  Communlty  is  reduced
to  ze?o by  the  end of  the  tnansltion  perlod,  proriucers  outslde
the  Common  Market  w111 be faced  wlth  an lnsuperable  obstacle
ln  selling  goods over  the  common  external  tarlff.
The Extegt  of_ Trads  Dlsadvantage
I  belleve  that  there  has been too  much concern  ln
Ameniea over  the  alleged  dlsadvantage  that  w111 be suffered  by
American producerg.  In  some  lnstances  concentratlon  on thls'
aspect  of  the  Common  lilarket  has  1ed to  lnadequate  and lnaccu-
rate  analysls.
There are  several  reasons  fon  thls  eonclusion.
Flrst,  wh1le  the  conmon  external  tarlff  w111 be hlgher
than  the  progressively  d1mtrn1sh1ng  lnternal  tarlff  faced  by
producers w1th1n bhe member  countrles,  in  its  net  effect  1t
w111 be no hlgher  than  the  tarlffs  whlch  Amerlcan  producersI
now face  1n selllng  ln  the  comnru.nlty  countrles.  The common
Market  eomplles  wlth  the  provlslons  of  0ATT, whlch  requires
that  ln  establlshlng  a customs unlon  the  exter.nal  tariff  cannot
be mone restrictlve  1n effect  than  the  tarlffs  of  the  lndlvldual
countries  comprlslng  that  customs un1on,
Secjln9r even thls  tarlff  leve1  cannot  be  taken  as  f1xed.
The external  tarlff  ls  subJect  to  negotlatlon.  what  ls  now
called  ln  Europe the  Dlllon  proposal  for  tarlff  negotiatlons
under  GATT  w111.  begln  1n the  Fall  of  1960.  Ttrese negotlatlons,
as you know, w111 be undertaken  under  the  authorlty  granted  the
Presldent  by  the  Tnade Agreements Extenslon  Act  of  rg5},  which
was deslgned  qulte  expltcltly  as a mechanlsm  for  reduclng  the
external  tarlff  of  the  Common  Market.
The wllli.ngness  of  our  Governnrent  to  employ the  machlnery
of  tnade  agreenent  negotlations  wlthout  hobbllng  itself  by an
undue preoccupation  wlth  peril  polnts  and escape clauses
ln  the  long  run  perhops,  the  extent  to  whlch  the  congress  per-
mlts  lt  bo do so --  w111 be erlticar  ln  determlning  the  char-
acter  of  the  external  tarlff  of  the  Common  Market.
I  cannot  emphasize thls  polnt  too much.
Third,  I  am eonvlnced  that  1n trade  pol1cy  the  baslc
thrust  of  the  common  Market  must lnevltably  be l1beral.  The
commltment to  a  liberal  pollcy  ls  made expllcit  by  the  Treaty.
Thls  cornnltment 1s happlly  1n aceord  wi.th  the  vlews,  as  r  have
observed  bhem, of  the  offlclals,who  have  the  responslbillty
for  the  admlnlstratlon  of  the  Common  Market.9
Most lmportant  of  all,  bhe conrnon  Market  w111 be com-
pelled  to  follow  a liberal  pollcy  out  of  economlc  necesslty,
slnce  the  communlty as a whole  ls  dependent to  a very  high
degree  on world  trade  to  a far  greater  <iegree, &s a  matter
of  fact,  than  ls  the Unltecl States.
My f-ourth  reason  for  mlnlmlzlng  the  trade  disadvantage
to  Amerlean producers  ls  that  r  would expect  to  see the  pro-
gresslve  enlargement  and ultlmate  ellmlna'c1on  of  quantltatlve
restrl-ctlons  wlth  respect  to  external  tracle.  I  need not  remind
the  Commlttee that  slnce  the  War guantltatlve  restrlctlons  have
been more formldable  lmpedlments  to  trade  than  tarlffs.
Jus'o as  ln  the  case of  tarlffs,  the  commltments under
GATT  w111 govern  the  reglme  of  quotas  that  may be applted
agalnst  outslde  tradej  and the  GATT  rules  cal"l  fon  the  lirnlted
use of  such quotas,  prlnclpally  i.n case of  balance  of  payments
difflcultles,  As the  Committee  knows, there  have recently
been lmportant  moves toward  the  llberalLzatlon  of  quotas  on
dollar  lmports  ln  l1ne  wlth  the  lmprovecl exchange posltlon  of
lndlvldual  member  countrles.  rf  present  trends  contlnue  r
am sure  we shall  see more such moves 1n  the  near  future.
on the  basls  of  these observatlons,  r  think  lt  can be
sald  wlth  some  confldence  that  through  the  flrst  stage  of  the
bransitlon  of  the  common  Manket whlch  ends  in  Lg6z,  tlre  com-
merclal  pollcy  of  the,Common  Market  w111 be more llberal10
thau  the  commerelal policies  of  the  indlvidual  countries  before
the  Common  Market  came lnto  exlstence.
whlle  long-range  predictlons  are hazardous,  r  see every
reason  why thls  trend  toward  llberallzatlon  should  contlnue
lnto  the future.  rf,  as may be expected,  the  eeonomles  of  the
slx  are  strengthened  by  the  common  Market,  thelr  abllity  to
undertake  further  llberalizatlon  measures w11l  be equally
strengthened.  At  the  same  tlme,  pressures  for  protectlonlsm
should  dlmlnlsh;  as European firms  reorganize  thelr  productlon
to  respond  to  the  intenslfled  competltlon  of  the  common
Market,  they  will  acqulre  the  ablllty  and confldence  to  face
competltlon  from  the  rest  of  the wor1d.
Glven  the  contlnuance  of  favorable  world  economlc
condltlons,  the  common  Mar:ket countrles  should  have no need
to  resort  to  import  guotas  for  balance  of  payments reasonsr
The lnternal  for"ces withln  the  common  lr{arket lnduclng  the
lmprovernent of  flscar  and monetarry  pollcles  support  thls
vievl.  For  example,  certain  of  the  recent  flscal  and monetarry
reforms  of  ccrnmunlty governments dlrected  at  lmprovlng  thelr
foreign  exchange posltlon  have been lnsplred  by  the  need
to  face.the  new realltles  of  the  common  Market.
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unlted  states  rnvestment ln  the  common  Market
So far  the  most spectacular  e.ffect  on Amenlcan buslness
associated  wlth  the  Common  Market  has been an acceLeratlon  of
dlnect  lnvestment  in  the  cornmunlty by Amerlcan flrms.  Thls
export  of  Amerlcan capital  and know-how 1s frequently  ex.-
plained  on the  ground that  American cornpanles are  seel<lng
sources  of  pnoductlon  in  Europe because they  fean  they  wll}
be unable  to  export  over  the  external  tarlff  lnto  the  corunon
l4anket 1n competitlon  wlth  local  pnoducers.
r  aln persuaded that  thls  ls  at  best  a partial,  and in
many cases a who11y lnaccurate,  explanatlon  of  the  reason
why Arnerlcan businesses  are  invading  the  communlty.  Even
without  the  common  Market,  some tnend  1n this  direction
would I1kely  have occurred  ab this  tlme.
The common  Market  dld  not  create  the  dynamrsm  whlch
has been galnlng  force  1n Europe,  partlcularly  over  the  past
1o years.  rt  ls  ln  a sense an expnesslon  of  that  clynamlsm.
But  it  should  greatly  ampllfy  and lntenslfy  lt.
Drring  the  present  decade lndustrlal  productlon  in
the  communlty has  been drlven  by  1ts  lnternal  engtne  of
growth.  This  ls  apparent  if  one comparres  the  lndlces  of
lndustrial  productlon  ln  the  common  Marl<et and  the  unlted
States  durlng  the  penlod  1950-1958.
tJh11e  Amerlcan productlon  has been marked by two
recesslons  and an only  moderate total  lncrease,  productiont2
ln  the  common  Market  has  rlsen  sliarply  and steadlly  dunlng
thls  entlre  perlod.
At  least  a partlal  explanatlon  of  this  phenomenon  can
be found  ln  the  fact  that  the  pencentage  of  Gross Natlonal
Product  devoted  to  flxed  capital  formatlon  has been not  only
hlgher  for  the  communlty than  for  the  unlted  states,  but  has
been lncneaslng  at  a faster  pace.  ln|hlle the  flgure  for  both
areas  1n 1950 stood  at  approxlmately  t7%,  bv  r95T the  commu-
nlty  percentage  had rlsen  to  over  21rt whLLe that  of  the  Unlted
states  had not  lncreased,  rt  is  scareely  surprlsi.ng  that
unlted  states  capltal  has been attracted  to  Europe by such
an lnvestment  boom.
Amerlcan buslnessmen see ln  western  Europe not  only
an  opportunlty  to  share  the  frults  of  an  expandlng  economy
but  also  the  chance to  play  a part  ln  the  exploltatlon  of  a
gneat  new mass market  a klnd  of  new economlc fr.ontlen
betng  cneated  by the  communlty.  r  €Lm  convlnced  fnom flrst-
hand acqualntance  wlth  a  substantlal  number of  speclfic  cases
that  thls  response  Eo a new economlc challenge  has been the
most  compelJ.lng conslderatlon  -lh persuadlng  corporate  manage-
ments to  seek productlon  sources  ln  western  rJurope.  Thelr
reactlon  to  the  common  Market  has  been a positl,ve  response
to  a  beckonlng  opportunlty  nather  than  the  mere deslre  to
protect  entrenched  export  mankets  from  belng  swallowed  up
by local  producers  that  enJoy a tarlff  advantage.13
Panenthetlcally,  howeven, r  suspect  that  conponate
managenrents  have  frequently  found  lt  useful  to  emphaslze the
dangens of  staylng  out  of  the  common  Market,  rather  than  the
opportunltles  of  gettlng  ln,  in  onder to  Justlfy  investment
declslons  to  thelr  Boards of  Dlrectors.
Not  only  ls  lt  llkely  that  Amerrcan caprtal  wirl  con-
tlnue  to  move to  the  communlty,  but  r  thlnk  it  probable  that
1f  present  trends  contlnue  there  may be a seeond wave of
lnvestment  two,  three  or  four  years  from  now,  of  far  greater
dlmenslons  than  the  present  one.  Many American  firms  today
are  content  merely  to  establlsh  beachheads of  productlon  ln
the  communlty.  when they  have acqulred  experlence,  when they
have galned  confldence  provided,  as  r  thlnk  lt  probable,
that  they  have made  money in  the  process  they  w111 be pre-
pared  to  put  much larger  amounts of  capltal  lnto  the  expan-
slon  of  their  operatlons.
Let  me tunn  fon  a moment from  the  corruner.clal impli-
catlons  of  the  Common  Market  to  1ts  broader  eonseguences  for
the  unlty  of  the  western  wonld.  The fear  ls  frequently  ex-
pressed  more often  1n the  oEEc capltals  than  1n hrashlngton
that  the  common  Market w1lr  operate  as a cllvlslve  force
ln  Europe.  This  vlew  has been glven  currency  particularly
slnce  the  breakd,own  of  the  negotlatlons  last  November  looklng
toward  the  creatton  of  a Free  Trade  Area  that  would  extend,:,r..1-'-i;,1  ',.,
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the  trad,e  arrangements  of  the  Comnron
of  the  seventeen OEEC  countr.les,.
Manket to  the  whole  area
Thene has,  r  thlnk,  been confuslon  ln  Ameriea as to
the  nature  of  the  Free  Trade  Area pnoposal  and some mrscon_
ceptlons  as to  why the  negotlations  falred.
The F'ree Trade  Area  and thls  polnt  cannot  be em_
phaslzed  too  strongly  --  was a purely  commerclal pnoposal.
ri;  had armost  no polrtlcal  content;  1t  provlded  for  only  the
most  nudtmentany  lnstltutr.onal  arrangements.  r  sald, a moment
ago that  the  communlty would  not  have  come lnto  being  except
for  the  poI1tlcal  obJectlves  whlch  lnsph"ed  lt;  1t  is  equalry
tnre  that  the  Free  Trade  Area proposal  would  never  have  been
put  fonward  except  as  a defenslve  neactlon  to  the  0onmon
Market.
A second point  of  eonsequence, not  unrerated  to  the
flnst,  ls  that  the  Free  Trade  Area dld  not  even meet the  test
of  a  customs ttnlon  slnce  1t  dld  not  requl-ne the  memben  nations
to  adopt  a  cormon external  tarlff.  Each would  have  been fnee
to  ta11or  lts  own commerclal po11cy toward  the  outslde  world
so  as  to  galn  the  maxlmum  nati.onat  advantage,
Thls  failure  to  nequlre  a  cornmon  external  tarlff  was
lmpontant.  It  ralsed  formldable  technlcal  and adrninlstnatlve
problems  slnce  elaborate  measures would have been necessary
to  pnevent  good.s from  enterlng  the  common  Market  by  tnans-
sh1pmentthrorrghcountr1esw1ththe1owestextenna1tar1ffs.-15
B.rt apant  from  thls,  the  nefusal  to  agree  to  the  prlnclple  of
a  common  external  tarlff  rendered  the  proposar  unattractlve  to
many of  the  most  ardent  supporters  of  the  common  Market.  They
felt  that  the  Free  Trade Area countrles  wourd enJoy ar1  the
commerclal  advantages of  free  access to  the  communlty whlle
shunning  the  polltlcaI  respons1bllltles  whlch  the  communlty
imposed.  Thls  would  be partlcular-ly  true  of  Great  Bnltaln
whlch,  under  the  Free  Trade  Area proposal  would  serve  as  the
nexus of  two tradlng  systems,  the  Brltlsh  CommonweaLth  and
the  F'ree Trade  Area.
The lmplrcatlons  of  this  last  polnt  can be best  seen
ln  relatlon  to  the  investment  po1lc1es  of  Amerlcan companles.
There  ls  no doubt  that  had the  Free  Trade  Area  been accepted
by  the  conmon Market  countnles  in  the  form  1n which  it  was
proposed  by  the  Unlted  Klngdom,  a  large  shane of  Amerlcan
dlrect  investment  now flowlng  lnto  the  Common  lrrarket would.
have  gone to  the  Unlted  Klngdom.
Producens  in  the  unlted  Klngdom vrould have  enJoyed the
best  of  both  worlds  preferentlal  access to  the  Commonwealth
and free  aceess to  the  Fnee Tnade Area.  while  it  is  true  that
for  many companles thls  would  have  been only  a marglnal  con_
slderatlon,  nonetheless,  all  other  thj.ngs  belng  equar,  tr am
certaln  that  ln  many cases  lt  would  have  tlpped  the  balance
in  the  cholce  of  locati.on.
As soon as  the  fall-ure  of  the  Free  Trade  Anea negotla_
tlons  became  pr:obabLe  motae  and more Amerlcan companies elected- tb
to  concentrate  lnvestment  ln  the
becontng dally  mor.e  evldent.  It
concern fon  non-member  European
Cornmunlty.  Thls  trend  ,ts
is  the  source  of  Lncr€asing
countnles  whlch  flnd  them-
selves  b;rpassed.  ,
Fon such  countrLes  the  tmpact  of  conunerclal  disadvan-
tage  ln  selltng  to  the  common  Marlret consumers ls  prospectlve
rathen  than  lmmedlate,  but  the  loss  of  lnvestrnent  capltal
appears  as  a  real  and present  danger.  They are  confronted
wlth  the  dlsturblng  spectacle  of  thelr  Common  Market  com-
petltons  gnowlng progresslvely  stronger  wlth  capltal  lnfuslons
from  the  unlted  states.  To compound  thelr  concern,  manufac_
ttrrens  ln  Manchester  and Llverpoor  are  necelvlng  letters  fnom
sales  agents  and dlstnlbutons  on the  contlnent  wlth  whom  they
have long  enjoyed  commerclal relatlono,  contalnlng  tle  rnelan-
choly  advlce  that  those  relatlons  are  belng  termlnated  in
favon  of  Amerlcan  companles whlch  are  prepared  to  lnvest
capltal  or  make other  attnactlve  concesslons.
These are  the  eonsLd.eratlons whlch  have,  r  bellerre,
proved  the  most compelllng  lncentlve  for  the  recent  meetlng
at  Stockholm and the  declslon  of  Beven oEEC  natlons  outslde
the  common  Market  to  form  a  free  trade  area  among themselves,
These countnies  are  Brltaln,  Austnta,  swltzerland,  the  three
Scandlnavlan  countrles,  and Por.tugal.  The pneclse  fonm of
the  stockholm  annangement ls  not  yet  lorovnr  and tts  rangen
consequences are  even less  clear.  No doubt  1t  ls  1n pant  a
:l:-.
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defenslve  response to  the  Cornmon  lvianket  and ln  part'a',$erlous  ,,
ef fort  to  bu1ld  a  bnldge  to  a  larger  Eur"opean  tradlng  s:crreme.
It  may prove  valuable  to  the  extent  that  it  facilltates
trade  among lts  members, but  1f  1t  remalns  as  slmp1y  an  addl-
tlonaL  pneferentlal  tradlng  area  on the  perlphery  of  the  Common
Manket, lt  could  nesult  ln  an artlflclal  dlstortlon  of  the
flow  of  trade  without  contrlbutlng  to  the  resolutlon  of  the
baslc  pr"oblern  of  Eunopean  economlc lntegratlon.
r  th1nk,  holvever, thai  we vrould do well  not  to  be too
alanmed by 1ts  dlvlstve  implicatlons.  Nor should we be un-
sympathetlc  wtth  the  dllemma of  the  European countrles  outslde
the  Common  Market.  For  what  seem to  them good and sufflclent
reasons  whlch  dlffer  fr:om one natlon  to  another  they
have feLt  unwllllng  or  unable  to  assume  the  polltleal  obllga-
tlons  of  the  Treaty  of  Rorne.  yet ,  dt  the  same tlme,  the  comlng
lnto  belng  of  the  Comrnon  Market  presents  them wlth  a serrous
problem  --  the  s€une  problem  lt  poses for  the  unlted  states,
although  1n a more intense  degree.
l',ie  can say  that  the  dlfference  betvreen our  attltude
toward  the  Cornmon  Market  and  ihat  of  the  non-memberr  Eunopean
natlons  is  that  we have accepted  the  proposltlon  that  European
unlflcation  is  1n oun natlonal  lnterest  whlIe  they  have not.
Elrt we cannot  be too  smug ln  maki"ng  thls  assertlon.  After  all,
the  non-member Eunopean nations  are  faced, wltir  a  enltlcal
natlonaL  declsion  whether  or  not  to  partlclpate  ln  an effortot'  -Eut  opean unlflcatlon
ounseLves geognaphlcally
--- whlIe  we have ,always, Cionsi1￿de.lisil.'.'  '
, 
.:  ;.  , .'.:.::t.1.:. 
: t,.,j,.: 
,
excluded from thls  problem,'o'f'.bh@e.
,
up to  thls  polnt,  we ln  the  unlted  states  have watched
the  evolutlon  of  Eunopean  polltlca}  and economlc lntegratlon
as  a klnd  of  benevolent  uncle  sam, speaklng  encounaglng words
but  reslstlng  the  temptatlon  to  suggest  the  preclse  course
whlch  this  evolutlon  mlght  take,  f  thlnk  that  on bal-ance thls
has  been a wlse  counse of  actlon.  Howevenr w€ may well.have
:reached.  the  polnt  where a new American lnitlatlrre  trs reafled
for'.--  an  lnltlatlve  almed at  presenvlng  and encouraglng  the
progress  towands polltteal  and economlc lntegnatlon  whlch  has
sofanbeenach1eved,wh11eavo1d1ngthed1vtsiveconse.
quences that  could  affect  a  range  of  conslclerations  much
broader  than  commerclal poIlcy.
rt  is  not  my purpose here  to  set  forth  in  detall  what  r
thlnk  the  pneclse  l1nes of  our national  policy  shourd,:be.  But
the  tlme  rnay be rlpe  when we should  propose  solne systematlc
aruangement f or  cooperatlon  ,betwebn :the  Unlted  'States, 
Canada,
ttre: comrnon  Market  (speaktng  as  a new entlty:  tn  the: !,restenn
l,,rlorId), the  unlted  Klngdom and other  members  of  the  oEEc. :-
'Together thes€' corrstltute  the maJor lndustrlialtzed  areas
of  the  westenn worrd,. ahd there  are  a number:  of  pnoblems whlch
thls  group  of  natlohs  could  profltably  dlscuss  over  a  continued
per'lod,
dimenslons.19
tr'Iashlngton a  fortnlght  ago,  he mad.e  several  publlc  referenc'es.
to  the  lnterest  of  the  communlty  1n provldlng  ald  to  the
undendeveloped  countrles,  r  thlnk  the  group of  natlons  r
have mentioned mlght  well  collaborate  on thts  pnoblem as well  :
as  on the  assoelated  problem  of  stablllzLng  world  mankets for
prlmary  commodltles.  The members  of  the  group mlght  usefully
consult  also  on the  questlons  of  lnter.natlonal  llqu-idity  and, 
',
finalIy,  mlght  seek greaten  agreement for  an Lncreaslng  ',
:: 11bera11zatlon  1n commercial poJ.1cy.
r  do not  mean that  we should  i.cropose the  creatl-on  of
a Free  Trade  Area  for  the  Atlantlc  comrnunlty.  r  clo have  the  ::
fee11ng,howeven,thatbycont1nuedandsystemat1cconsu1ta-
tlon  among  the  natlons  and groups  of  natlons  r  have listed
wecou1dsett1emanyofthetoughcommerc1a1po11cyquest1onS''.
that  ane disturbLng  us,  leavlng  to  GATT  thelr  lmprementatlon
1n the  context  of  a multllateral  system.
rnmak1ngth1sproposa1:Iwou].dnotw1shtobe:unden-
stood,  by any stnetch  of  the  lmaglnatlon,  as  suggesttng  a
concent  of  the  lndustrlall.zed  natlons  agalnst  the  less: aeVel-
opedareas.RatherIwou1d'see1tasamechan1smwhenebyt}re:
lndustrl,allzed  natlons  can arulve  at  an extenslon  and better
dlstributlon  of  tlreii'  responslbllltles  to  lncrease  the  standard
of  Ilvlng  and well-belng  all  over  the  world.
11  :'
l:t  .1'-  '2O  .-
-  '  rt  ls  anclent wrsoom  that  we ar-re  always p*p*ii'-i;' 
' :
F-  -5--  --  --
flght  the  next  wan vrlth  the  weapons of  the  last.  For  a  long
tilne  we have made oun econornlc declslons  wlthln  the  framework
of  economlc lnstltutions  and pollcles  that  $rere for  the  most
'
ostwan perlod  when rehablirtation
and necovery  were the  prlme  need of  the  lilestern  world,  T6day
we are  faced  wlth  a who1ly different  set  of  condltlons  and __--
pr￿eoccupat1ons.Anapproachrespons1veto.,mod'ern'.o,,6*i"'
rea11t1esm1ghtwe11bewe1comed...'￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
.: 
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